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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

Case No. 960214-CA

V.
GLENN EARL LLOYD, II,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an interlocutory appeal brought by the State
challenging the magistrate's dismissal (after preliminary
hearing) of one count of pattern of unlawful activity, Utah Code
Ann. §§ 76-10-1603 and 1603.5, and ten counts of money
laundering, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1903.

This Court obtains

jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2)(a) and Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did the magistrate properly dismiss the count alleging

pattern of unlawful activity when, after the preliminary hearing,
he concluded that the state had failed to demonstrate the
existence of an "enterprise"?

This issue presents a question of

law which this Court reviews de novo without deference.
Jaeger, 896 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).

State v.

2.

Did the magistrate properly dismiss the money

laundering counts when, after the preliminary hearing, he
concluded that the state had failed to demonstrate that Lloyd
attempted to conceal or disguise the alleged proceeds of criminal
activity?

This issue also presents a question of law which this

Court reviews de novo without deference.

Id.

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
All relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules
are contained in Addendum B of Appellant's Brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant Lloyd was charged by information with 14 counts of
securities fraud, 10 counts of offering unregistered securities,
one count of pattern of unlawful activity (racketeering), and 10
counts of money laundering.

In the Fall of 19 95, the lower court

held a four day preliminary hearing and thereafter bound Lloyd
over on the securities violation counts, but dismissed the
racketeering and money laundering counts.

With respect to the

racketeering count, the magistrate found that the prosecution
failed to establish the existence of an "enterprise" which is one
of the elements of that offense.

The money laundering counts

were dismissed because the magistrate concluded the prosecution
failed to establish that Lloyd made financial transactions with
the intent to conceal of disguise the proceeds obtained from the
alleged victims.

2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

Sometime in the early 1990s, defendant Lloyd set up an

investment advisor business called Applied Financial Concepts.
(R. at 1062)

A number of the investor/victims in this case were

established clients who had in the past successfully invested
their money through Lloyd in various investments presented by
Lloyd. (See, e.g., R. at 1087-89)
2.

Subsequent to an investigation by the State of Utah, on

or about December 6, 1994, Lloyd was charged in a 34-count
information alleging 24 counts of securities violations, 1 count
of pattern of unlawful activity (racketeering), and 10 counts of
money laundering.
3.

(R. 3-22)

On or about July 20, 1995, the state filed an amended

information which included an allegation added to count 25
(racketeering) that certain assets held by Lloyd (including
personal property such as a piano, a car, and a boat) were
forfeitable under Utah's racketeering statute.

(R. at 200-01,

208)
4.

In the Affidavit of Probable Cause, Verdi White, a

sergeant with the Utah Department of Public Safety, explained the
nature and scope of his investigation of Lloyd.

Between January

1, 1990, and November 1, 1994, Lloyd allegedly sold investments
in the following companies:

Sourceline Capital; F.C. Finance;

F.C. Leasing; A F C ; Peak Strategy Management; Cross Country
Management; A F C

Inter-cap; Tempus Utile; CC Management;
3

Internal Capitalization Partnership; Star King, Inc.; Adalyn
Financial Services; and M.M.G. Inc. (R. at 29)
5.

Lloyd allegedly offered these investments to potential

investors, and in so doing made material misrepresentations or
omitted material facts about the companies.

It was further

alleged that the securities Lloyd offered for sale were
unregistered.
6.

(R. at 30-32)

When an investor purchased an interest in one of the

investments identified in paragraph 4, the investor would write a
check payable to that particular company, and the check would
then be deposited into an account bearing the name of that
company.

Lloyd had signatory control over all but one of the

investment accounts.
7.

(R. at 34; 1109-1186; 1223-1235; 1157)

In addition to the above-referenced allegations, the

state claimed that the deposits made by Lloyd into the various
accounts, as well as transactions between accounts, constituted
money laundering violations under Utah law.

Accordingly, Lloyd

allegedly "diverted these funds to other accounts or invested
said funds into other enterprises, all for the purpose of
continuing the unlawful activity of securities fraud."

(R. at

34-35)
8.

Based on the allegations of securities violations and

money laundering (the predicate acts), the state charged Lloyd
with engaging in a pattern of unlawful activity under Utah Code
Ann. § 76-10-1903 (racketeering).
4

The state's theory was

expressed as follows: "By collecting investments in the listed
companies, Lloyd was able to acquire, establish, and maintain
control over those enterprises.

Lloyd owned and operated [the]

enterprises [described in paragraph 4 ] . "
9.
11

(R. at 32-33)

However, Verdi White stated in his affidavit that

[m] ost of these enterprises were no more than bank accounts

through which Lloyd ran investor funds."
10.

(R. at 33)

At the preliminary hearing, White testified that he

discovered registered names for some but not all of the
businesses.

In particular, Sourceline Capital (R. at 1125), F.C.

Finance (R. at 1138), F.C. Leasing (R. at 1144), and Tempus Utile
(R. at 1165) were registered business names.
found no evidence that A F C

However, White

(R. at 1335-39), Peak Strategy

Management (R. at 1153), Cross Country Management (R. at 1168),
A F C

Inter-cap (R. at 1161), C.C. Management (R. at 1168), or

Internal Capitalization Partnership (R. at 1170) were registered
business names.
11.

Significantly, White also testified that during his

investigation he found no evidence of ongoing business in the
various "enterprises" which he had referenced in his affidavit:
Sourceline Capital (R. at 1124-25, 1133); F.C. Finance (R. at
1138, 1143); F.C. Leasing (R. at 1144); A.F.C. (R. at 1149); Peak
Strategy Management (R. at 1153); A F C Inter-cap (R. at 1161);
C.C. Management (R. at 1168); Internal Capitalization Partnership
(R. at 1170); Cross Country Management (R. at 1168).
5

Further,

the state offered no evidence that Tempus Utile was a company
with ongoing business activities.
12.

The Cross Country Management account was the only

account which Lloyd did not solely own and control.

Although the

account signatories were two other individuals, Lloyd is the
person who opened the account by depositing a check from one of
his clients.
13.

(R. at 1157; 1533-40)

The state offered no evidence that Lloyd had employees

at Applied Financial Concepts.

Moreover, although there were

others who were signatories on bank accounts, the state did not
explain the relationship of those individuals to either Lloyd or
to Applied Financial Concepts.
14.

At the end of the preliminary hearing, the magistrate

made the following Conclusions of Law:

(1) probable cause

existed to bind over counts 1 through 24, (2) probable cause
existed to establish evidence of the pattern element required
under the racketeering statute, (3) there was no probable cause
to suggest that Lloyd's investment advisor business, as well as
his use of various dbas in establishing checking accounts,
demonstrated the existence of an enterprise, (4) the evidence
used to establish the investment advisor company, as well as
evidence of the dbas, is evidence that further establishes and
proves the pattern element, but does not prove the enterprise,
and (4) there was no probable cause to bind over the money
laundering counts since there was insufficient evidence to
6

establish that Lloyd intentionally concealed the proceeds
obtained from the unlawful activity.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1.

Pattern of Unlawful Activity (Racketeering).

Under

Utah's racketeering statute, which is modeled after the federal
statute commonly known as RICO, the state must prove the
existence of an "enterprise."

The magistrate properly dismissed

the racketeering count because the state failed to establish the
enterprise element of the statute.

During the relevant period of

time, Lloyd worked as an investment advisor.

The evidence at the

preliminary hearing established that he was a "one-man show"
without associates or employees.

Accordingly, the state did not

prove that an enterprise existed which had a separate and
distinct identity from Lloyd himself.

The state merely relied on

the pattern of unlawful activity to prove the enterprise.
2.

Money Laundering.

By depositing the money in various

bank accounts, Lloyd did not attempt to conceal or disguise his
control over proceeds which he obtained from the alleged victims
in this case.

This analysis requires the proper focus.

Lloyd's

alleged misrepresentations to the victims are irrelevant.

The

state cannot bootstrap its money laundering theory to the
evidence supporting counts alleging securities violations.

In

this case the circumstances surrounding the actual deposits (the
financial transactions) did not show an intent to conceal or
disguise.

Lloyd was the signatory on all but one of the
7

accounts, and his signature was required on the back of each
check for deposit.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Magistrate Properly Dismissed the Racketeering
Count Since the State Failed to Demonstrate the
Existence of an "Enterprise".
Count 25 of the Amended Information (R. at 200-01) charges

Lloyd under the Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act, Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-10-1601 et seq.

The prohibited acts are set forth in Utah

Code Ann. § 76-10-1603 [hereinafter "racketeering statute"].
Section 1603 is divided into four sections, and Lloyd was charged
under the first three.

The statute, with the elements of each

section bracketed, reads as follows:
(1) It is unlawful for [1] any person who has
received any proceeds derived, whether directly or
indirectly, from a pattern of unlawful activity in
which the person has participated as a principal, [2]
to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of
that income, or the proceeds of the income, or the
proceeds derived from the investment or use of those
proceeds, [3] in the acquisition of any interest in, or
the establishment or operation of, any enterprise.
(2) It is unlawful for [1] any person through a
pattern of unlawful activity [2] to acquire or
maintain, directly or indirectly, [3] any interest in
or control of any enterprise.
(3) It is unlawful for [1] any person employed by or
associated with any enterprise [2] to conduct or
participate, whether directly or indirectly, in the
conduct of that enterprise's affairs [3] through a
pattern of unlawful activity.
(4) It is unlawful for any person to conspire to
violate any provision of Subsection (1), (2), or (3).

8

The statute is modeled after Title 18 U.S.C. 1962
(Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations or RICO), and
the structure of the two statutes is identical.

The federal

statute, however, includes language which identifies the
constitutional requirement of an interstate commerce nexus.
Sections (1), (2), and (3) of the state statute have their
counterparts in sections (a), (b), and (c) of the federal
statute, respectively.
The State advances two alternative theories to support its
argument that there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate the
enterprise element under section 1603.

First, Lloyd operated an

investment advisor business, Applied Financial Concepts, and the
pattern of unlawful activity was carried out during the course of
advising his clients about various investment opportunities.
Under this theory, Lloyd's investment advisor company is the
enterprise.

Second, Lloyd was involved in an association-in-fact

enterprise consisting of himself and the registered and
unregistered businesses he represented.

(Plaintiff's Brief at

27) .
A.

Introduction and Background.

State and federal racketeering statutes are powerful and
popular weapons in the prosecutor's arsenal.

The original target

of the federal statute was organized crime, such as the Mafia,
since traditional criminal statutes were having little impact in
that context.

The scope of racketeering prosecutions, however,
9

has expanded considerably, and includes white collar business
fraud.

One commentator has attempted to explain the popularity,

as well as the inherent dangers, of the federal racketeering
statute:
The dramatic increase in the use of RICO in criminal
and civil prosecutions beginning in the early 1980s can
be explained, in part, by the lure of financial rewards
[forfeiture of assets] that RICO offers. The
predominant reason for the increased use of RICO,
however, lies in the elasticity of RICO's limiting
principles of "predicate" acts, a "pattern" of
racketeering conduct, and an involved "enterprise."
While these terms were meant to distinguish between the
common criminal and organized criminal, they were not
equal to the task. Accordingly, RICO's perceived and
actual overbreadth can be traced directly to the
failure of these statutory terms to place meaningful
limits on RICO's reach in either criminal or civil
prosecutions.
Terrence G. Reed, The Defense Case for RICO Reform, 43 Vand. L.
Rev. 691, 693 (1990).
This can also be said for the Utah statute, which relies on
the same dangerously flexible principles, principles which do not
have any self-evident meaning and which can be molded and shaped
to fit the most common kinds of criminal activity and the most
conventional kinds of criminals.

One critic of the generic and

indiscriminate use of federal civil racketeering statutes has
observed the following:
My RICO perspective comes from my years as a federal
district court judge in Chicago from 1980 to 1987, when
I witnessed the real birth and growth of civil RICO. I
am told . . . that for a time I had written more RICO
opinions than any other judge in the country. . . . As
I dealt with these cases it became clear to me that
most civil RICO cases simply should not be in federal
10

court. The majority of civil RICO cases involve
commonplace commercial controversies . . . . [which
are] recharacterized by resourceful attorneys to
conform with the requirements of RICO: adding a few
allegations of the use of the mails or wires in
furtherance of a fraudulent scheme, describing how the
mail or wire fraud offenses form a pattern, and
explaining how the defendants conducted the affairs of
an appropriate enterprise. Thus transmogrified, the
ordinary state law fraud or contract action becomes a
federal "racketeering" case. . . .
Susan Getzendanner, Judicial "Pruning" of "Garden Variety Fraud"
Civil RICO Cases Does Not Work: It's Time for Concrress to Act, 43
Vand. L. Rev. 673, 674 (1990).
Although the focus of this criticism is civil RICO, the same
reasoning applies to the use of racketeering statutes in ordinary
criminal fraud cases.

Of course the Utah Legislature has acted,

and has included securities fraud as a predicate offense under
section 1603.

The foregoing critique, however, does demonstrate

why it is appropriate and necessary to clearly define statutory
concepts such as "enterprise" and "pattern of unlawful activity."
Given the significant due process concerns when a person's
liberty is at stake, the need for clarity in criminal cases is
even more important than in civil cases.

These definitional

problems, as well as policy concerns and the danger of selective
prosecution, are most notable in the context of white collar
crime z1
1

Indeed, as one lawyer for the Department of Justice has
noted, the government must exercise restraint in its use of RICO
to prosecute white-collar crime. Edward S.G. Dennis, Jr.,
Current RICO Policies of the Department of Justice, 43 Vand. L.
11

Cases in which the defendants were regarded by
prosecutors as professional white collar offenders . .
. would presumably be regarded by prosecutors as worthy
of the enhanced sanctions of RICO.
Notably, almost none of these [white collar] cases
involves even a hint of organized criminal activity.
Moreover, it is very difficult to distinguish these
federal cases from the typical run of fraud cases that
are prosecuted daily in the federal courts without the
assistance of RICO. . . . The only apparent motivating
factor for the use of RICO in these cases would appear
to be prosecutorial interest in either the aggravated
sentencing possible under RICO or the specific
forfeiture remedy--or, along the same lines, the
greater rhetorical impact achieved by convicting a
white collar defendant of a more serious sounding
crime.
Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, 87 Columbia
L. Rev. 661, 751 (1987) (criticizing the controversial and
widespread use of RICO in ordinary business fraud cases).

In the

last fifteen years or so, courts have attempted to properly the
limit the scope and reach of federal RICO.

This Brief advocates

the application of those limiting principles to Utah's
racketeering statute, a law which has not been the subject of
thorough judicial scrutiny since its enactment.2

Rev. 651, 671 (1990).
2

There are few cases interpreting Utah's racketeering
statute. As a result, this Brief relies extensively on federal
law since the majority of racketeering cases (both civil and
criminal) are filed in federal court.
12

B.

Under Section 1603, the Enterprise Must Be
Distinct and Separate from the Pattern of
Unlawful Activity.

As an essential element of a racketeering offense under
Utah's racketeering statute, the state must prove that the
pattern of unlawful activity is connected to an "enterprise."
However, the state failed to meet its burden on this element.
Lloyd did not associate with nor did he acquire, operate, or
maintain an "enterprise" as that term is defined in the case law.
In United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1982),
one of the leading cases discussing the enterprise element of the
parallel federal statute, the Eighth Circuit formulated the
following three-part test for a RICO enterprise:

(1) there must

be a common or shared purpose among those associated with the
enterprise, (2) the enterprise must "function as a continuing
unit," and (3) the enterprise must have "an ascertainable
structure distinct from that interest in the conduct of a pattern
of racketeering activity."

674 F.2d at 665 (8th Cir. 1982).

In Bledsoe, the court concluded that the government did not
prove an enterprise, and reversed the defendant's RICO
conviction.

The government had argued that a group of

agricultural cooperatives was an enterprise whose purpose was to
engage in a securities fraud scheme.

The court explained the

structure requirement as follows:
This distinct structure might be demonstrated by proof
that a group engaged in a diverse pattern of crimes or
that it has an organizational pattern or system of
13

authority beyond what was necessary to perpetrate the
predicate crimes. The command system of a Mafia family
is an example of this type of structure as is the
hierarchy, planning, and division of profits within a
prostitution ring.
674 F.2d at 665.
Logically, there must be some degree of organization
necessary to commit the predicate acts in the first place.
Merely showing the commission of predicate offenses, however,
does not prove an enterprise.

Accordingly, this led the Bledsoe

court to conclude that "an enterprise cannot simply be the
undertaking of the acts of racketeering11 nor can it be the
minimal association which surrounds the illegal conduct.
664.

This makes a great deal of sense because

n

Id. at

[a]ny two

criminal acts will necessarily be surrounded by some degree of
organization and no two individuals will ever jointly perpetrate
a crime without some degree of association apart from the
commission of the crime itself."

Id.

The Eighth Circuit has further observed that several
criminal acts committed by a common set of perpetrators "will
necessarily be surrounded by some degree of organization," but in
order to constitute an offense under RICO, the prosecution must
show "proof of some structure separate from the racketeering
activity and distinct from the organization which is a necessary
incident to the racketeering."3

Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053,

3

In the context of a federal narcotics offense, a
defendant who supervises five or more people can be charged with
14

1060 (8th Cir. 1982).

Accordingly, to show an "enterprise," the

prosecutor must offer different evidence than that evidence which
was offered to prove a "pattern of racketeering."
Another Eighth Circuit case, decided after Bledsoe,
illustrates the necessary distinction between the enterprise and
the pattern of racketeering activity.

In United States v.

Leisure, 844 F.2d 1347 (8th Cir. 1988), the defendants challenged
their RICO convictions arguing that the government did not
provide sufficient evidence of an enterprise.

The defendants

were attempting to illegally infiltrate two labor unions in the
St. Louis area by murdering opponents.

The court found that

there was sufficient evidence to show an ascertainable structure
distinct from the pattern requirement.

The court noted that the

structure was found in the family and social relationships
between the members of the group and their concerted attempts to
gain control of the local unions, which could be viewed in
complete isolation from the group's pattern of racketeering
activity.

The court further observed that this was precisely the

kind of command system discussed in Bledsoe.

Id. at 1363-64.

See also United States v. Flvnn, 852 F.2d 1045 (8th Cir. 1988) (a

operating a "continuing criminal enterprise." 21 U.S.C. §
848(c)(2)(A). The "enterprise" is proved simply by the number of
people involved in the criminal activity. This way federal
prosecutors have a much easier time of proving the existence of
an enterprise, since all that is required is the ability to
count. "Enterprise" under this statute means and association of

people.
15

case related to Leisure and relying on many of the same facts and
relationships to demonstrate the enterprise element).
The Seventh Circuit also requires a distinction between
pattern and enterprise.

In United States v. Masters, 924 F.2d

1362 (7th Cir. 1991), the court reasoned that " [i]f the
'enterprise' is just a name for the crimes the defendants
committed . . . then it would not be an 'enterprise' within the
meaning of the statute. . . . Otherwise, two statutory elements-enterprise and pattern--would be collapsed into one."
1362, 1367 (7th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).

924 F.2d

In Masters, the

government advanced the theory that a lawyer and his law firm
together with two police officers and their respective police
departments (three people, three organizations) constituted an
enterprise under RICO.

The lawyer, Masters, had a kickback

scheme with the officers, Keating and Corbitt, whereby the
officers referred arrested persons to Masters for legal
assistance.

Masters had similar schemes with other officers in

the area.
Masters then discovered that his wife was having an affair,
and enlisted the help of Keating and Corbitt to kill her.

The

murder was carried out, and Masters collected on the $100,000
insurance policy.

On appeal, the court found there was

sufficient evidence for the jury to find an "enterprise
consisting of the three defendants and the three organizations
that they controlled or manipulated" and that this operated as an
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"organization with a structure and goals separate from the
predicate acts . . . "

Id. at 1367.

As in Leisure and Flynn, the

court emphasized that the enterprise was characterized by the
informal relationships among the defendants that permitted them
to respond quickly and effectively as a cohesive group in order
to further their goals.

Id.

Finally, the separateness of pattern and enterprise is again
demonstrated by the facts in United States v. Salerno, 868 F.2d
524 (2d Cir. 1988).

Salerno is the quintessential case applying

the federal RICO statute to the complex criminal schemes of
organized crime.

The Salerno court began by describing the

nature of the enterprise:
The RICO enterprise alleged in the indictment is an
organization known as the "Commission" of La Cosa
Nostra, a nationwide criminal society which operates
through local organizations know as "families." The
indictment alleged, and substantial evidence at trial
established, that the Commission has for some time
acted as the ultimate ruling body over the five La Cosa
Nostra families in New York City and affiliated
families in other cities. The general purpose of the
Commission is to regulate and facilitate the
relationships between and among the several La Cosa
Nostra families, and more specifically to promote and
coordinate joint ventures of a criminal nature
involving the families, to resolve disputes among the
families, to extend formal recognition to "bosses" of
the families and on occasion resolve leadership
disputes within a family, to approve the initiation or
"making" of new members of the families, and to
establish rules governing the families, officers and
members of La Cosa Nostra.
868 F.2d at
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The attributes of the organization or enterprise, however,
were distinct from the various criminal schemes which established
a pattern of criminal activity (the predicate acts).

The first

scheme was a labor bribery operation known as "the Club."

The

Club was an arrangement between the Commission and several New
York concrete construction companies whereby the Commission
threatened labor problems if companies did not provide kick-backs
to the Commission.

The second scheme was a loansharking

conspiracy, and the third was a scheme to commit murder in order
to end a dispute in the Bonanno crime family.
C.

Id.

The Actor Cannot be Both the Person and the
Enterprise that Conducts its Affairs through
a Pattern of Racketeering Activity.

There is another limiting principle in RICO jurisprudence
that further restricts the definition or scope of an enterprise.
Not only must the enterprise be distinct from the pattern, but
the actor cannot be both the "person" and the "enterprise" that
conducts its affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.
United States v. DiCaro, 772 F.2d 1314, 1319-20 (7th Cir. 1985).
In DiCaro, the government's enterprise theory under section (c)
was that defendant had conducted his own affairs through a
pattern of racketeering activity.

The predicate offenses were

four actual or attempted armed robberies, two thefts, and an
attempted murder.

On appeal, the court reversed the RICO

conviction, reasoning that "if we construed section 1962(c) to
permit the same entity to be both the person and the enterprise,
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we would reach the anomalous result that the entity was employed
by or associated with itself."

Id. at 1319.

The court noted

that in a prior civil RICO case, McCullough v. Suter, 757 F.2d
142 (7th Cir. 1985), a defendant-proprietor of a sole
proprietorship could be held liable under section (c). DiCaro,
772 F.2d at 1320.

The distinguishing fact in McCullough,

however, was that the defendant had several employees working for
him; accordingly "'this made his company an enterprise, and not
just a one-man band.'"
144).

Id. (quoting McCullough, 757 F.2d at

"'[I]f the sole proprietorship were strictly a one-man

show,'" liability for the defendant would be precluded under
section (c).

Id.

"If Suter had no employees or other associates

and simply did business under the name of the National Investment
Publishing Company, it could hardly be said that he was
associating with an enterprise called the National Investment
Publishing Company; you cannot associate with yourself, any more
than you can conspire with yourself just by giving yourself a nom
de guerre."

McCullough, 757 F.2d at 144.

A federal district court in Illinois reached the same
conclusion in a case with a white-collar defendant, a lawyer who
was a sole practitioner.

In United States v. Yonan, 622 F.Supp.

721 (N.D. 111. 1985), the government proceeded on a section (c)
theory alleging eight predicate offenses of mail fraud.

The

court dismissed the section (c) count, and cited DiCaro for the
proposition that the entity or person cannot be employed by or
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associated with itself.

Id. at 723-24.

The principle in DiCaro and Yonan was applied in United
States v. Benny, 786 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir. 1986), but with a
different, although logical, result.

While adopting the analysis

of the Seventh Circuit, Id. at 1416, the court in Benny
nevertheless affirmed the conviction, observing that the
defendant had not

associated with himself:

"The indictment thus

separated defendant Benny, an individual, from the enterprise, an
association of four individuals [three of whom were codefendants] allegedly operating under the name of one of them."
Id. at 1415.
This principle also undermines the state's argument that
Lloyd was part of an association-in-fact with the businesses he
purported to represent.

(State's Brief at 35)

This raises

conflicting theories, because at the same time the state offered
uncontroverted evidence that those businesses did not even exist.
Accordingly, the state advances the argument that Lloyd was part
of an association-in-fact enterprise with businesses which had no
factual existence.
In United States v. Feldman, 853 F.2d 648, 656-57 (9th Cir.
1988) , the court found an association-in-fact enterprise made up
of seven corporations and two individuals. The indictment in the
case alleged that the enterprise "associated . . . for the
purpose of defrauding insurance companies and others through
repeated acts of arson."

Id. at 657.
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The Feldman court

emphasized that "[a] number of the corporations in count 18 were
far from 'one-man shows':

[four of the corporations] had

employees and operated as active businesses. . . . All the
corporations enjoyed the legal status that incorporation
provides.

It was their very separate existence that made

Feldman's activities possible and profitable . . . "

Id. at 656.

Accordingly, the group of corporations and individuals were
separate and distinct from the defendant himself.

Id.

To

analyze whether an enterprise exits various corporations and
individuals, it is necessary to identify "objective
interconnections" and this requires "a careful scrutiny of the
facts."

IcL_ at 657-58.

One of the core facts of the Feldman decision is that the
government apparently offered evidence that the corporations were
actually conducting business, and that the individuals were
actively involved in the operations of those corporations.

In

fact, the court pointed out that the companies were engaged in
legal activities such as tool manufacturing, business
acquisitions, building modular homes, and operating a car wash.
Significantly, the court also noted that "[t]hose corporations
created by Feldman that could be construed as existing only to
defraud creditors . . . were not charged as part of the
enterprise."

Id. at 660.

In the instant case, state investigator Verdi White
testified at the preliminary hearing that he found no evidence of
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any day-to-day operations in any of the companies which Lloyd had
allegedly created to perpetrate the fraud.

The State's theory is

that the companies did not exist, and that Lloyd merely set up
the bank accounts as part of the ruse.

It defies logic to

conclude that for enterprise purposes one may "associate" with
businesses that do not exist.

One might respond that this

reasoning enables culpable individuals to escape liability by
creating "shell" businesses.

Such a conclusion, however, ignores

the precise social and economic harms which racketeering statutes
were designed to attack:

organized and complex criminal schemes

not easily crushed by traditional crime fighting tools.
In discussing the objectives of federal RICO, the court in
Bledsoe explained that "[1]egitimate businesses and other
legitimate organizations tend to have a definite structure and
clear boundaries which limit the applicability of a criminal
statute aimed at the infiltration of criminal elements into these
entities."

674 F.2d at 662.

Accordingly, this infiltration of

"legitimate entities also warrants [RICO's] severe sanctions,"
such as forfeiture of assets.

Id.

This identifies the problem

of systemic corruption in a legitimate business or organization,
where prosecution of one or several persons under traditional
criminal statutes will not dismantle the entire business.
However, the one-man show operates differently, and a traditional
prosecution under the substantive law, such as mail or securities
fraud, will achieve the desired result of stopping the corrupt
22

activities completely.
only one head to sever.
nothing left.

Where the actor works alone, there is
Once that is accomplished, there is

Therefore, an investment advisor who works alone,

and in the course of business commits several acts of securities
fraud, poses substantially less harm than a brokerage house that
does the same thing through its brokers, and the practice is
embedded in the structure of the company.
If racketeering statutes were not interpreted with the
Bledsoe limiting construction, then an actor whom commits
multiple criminal acts simultaneously creates an enterprise.
Central to the issue in the case at bar is the fact that when
viewing the state's case in a light most favorable to the state,
there was no evidence of an organizational pattern or system of
authority beyond what was necessary for one man, acting alone, to
perpetrate the predicate crimes.
According to the state, Lloyd completed the predicate
offenses while working as an investment advisor, and that Lloyd's
identity as an investment advisor coupled with allegations that
he sold fraudulent investments is sufficient to demonstrate an
enterprise.
Likewise, a physician who defrauds Medicare has also created
an enterprise, as has a criminal defense lawyer who submits
fraudulent claims in federal court for work done by court
appointment under the Criminal Justice Act.

Although section

1603 reaches the activities of the so-called "one man show," the
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enterprise principle must be carefully defined to attack the more
complicated, far-reaching, and sophisticated criminal schemes
rather than "garden variety" fraud.

This is true whether the

scheme is accomplished by one person or by many.
Lloyd was a "one-man show" working without associates.

He

cannot associate with himself or the business, Applied Financial
Concepts, which is simply an alter ego or his nom de

guerre.

There are no facts in this case which suggest the organization or
command structure necessary to demonstrate an enterprise under
section 1603.

The state argues that Lloyd "likely employed a

secretary" and that there was evidence offered at the preliminary
hearing "suggesting that defendant had at least one employee."
State's Brief at 34-35.

This kind of supposition is inadequate

as a matter of law to show organization and command structure.4
The evidence offered at the preliminary hearing demonstrated
(for the narrow purpose of a probable cause determination) the
commission of multiple similar offenses by an investment advisor
while in his professional capacity.

Viewing the evidence in a

light most favorable to the state Lloyd, while wearing his
investment advisor hat, violated state law (the predicate acts of
4

Organization and command structure are two of the central
concepts used to determine the existence of an enterprise or
association. The state warns that "defendant should not escape
enterprise liability solely because he was sophisticated enough
to avoid formal incorporation." State's Brief at 35. However,
the absence of formal incorporation is not and never has been the
way to avoid racketeering liability, and Lloyd has never argued
the contrary position.
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Counts 1 through 24 and 26 through 35). Thus the state's
sweeping theory is that if an investment advisor, in the course
of doing business, violates the securities laws, then the advisor
has created an enterprise for carrying out a pattern of unlawful
activity.

It makes no difference if the advisor was also

offering legitimate investment opportunities such as certificates
of deposit, insurance policies, and annuities.

Three separate

acts of securities fraud by an investment advisor is a per se
violation of the racketeering statute.
Finally, the state argues, in support of its section (1) and
(2) theories, that when Lloyd deposited funds into bank accounts
that he controlled, including his business account, that this
constituted the use

of income from racketeering activity to

operate the enterprise.

State's Brief at 35.

Under sections (1) and (2) of the racketeering statute, the
state must still demonstrate the existence of an enterprise, and
then further show that proceeds derived from prohibited
activities were used to acquire, maintain, or operate the
enterprise.

The state appears to suggest that "enterprise" might

have a different definition under sections (1) and (2) than it
does under section (3). But the essential logical flaw remains:
even if the actor is putting the proceeds back into the
enterprise, the enterprise is himself.

Again, according to the

state's argument, the doctor or lawyer who puts a few thousand
dollars of tainted funds into a business account can be
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prosecuted under a racketeering theory, even if the actor did not
associate with others for a common purpose.
Whatever section of the statute supports the theory of a
racketeering prosecution, it is essential to keep in mind the
powerful forfeiture provisions available to the state.

Although

it is important to compensate victims for the harm done to them,
that is not the objective of those provisions.

The objective is

to destroy the enterprise thereby protecting the public from
future harm.

The state obtains the same result with the

successful prosecution of the one-man show.
is gone, and so is his business.

The culpable person

Forfeiture simply becomes

window dressing.
Consider the circumstances of a prostitute who works alone.
She meets the pattern element by committing multiple predicate
offenses.

In can be assumed that some of the money she makes she

"invests" back into the business, perhaps by purchasing clothes,
condoms, and other necessities of the trade.

The state's

proposed definition of "enterprise" would indeed apply to an
ordinary prostitute who uses the money she earns to stay in
business.
The perpetual harm caused by an enterprise, irrespective of
the status of the people involved in the enterprise, appears to
be the rationale behind the rule that in a civil RICO claim
alleging a violation under section 1962(a), a plaintiff must
demonstrate that he suffered an "injury 'by reason o f
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defendant ['s] investment of racketeering income in an
enterprise."

Ouaknine v. MacFarlane, 897 F.2d 75, 83 (2d Cir.

1990); accord Grider v. Texas Oil and Gas Corp., 868 F.2d 1147,
1149 (10th Cir.), cert, denied,
(1989).

U.S.

, 110 S.Ct. 76

Thus the harm identified under the first two sections of

either the state or federal statute is connected to the ongoing
activities of the corrupt enterprise.

In the instant case, any

injury was caused by the alleged securities violations, not by
any alleged investment back into an enterprise.

Further, the

deposit of proceeds into a business account does not even come
close to providing adequate evidence of investment in the
enterprise, especially since the state contends that money was
often transferred between accounts controlled by Lloyd.

The

state cannot argue with any specificity how proceeds were used to
acquire, maintain, or operate the enterprise.
In sum, the allegations of securities fraud and offering
unregistered securities are factually inseparable from the socalled enterprise.

The magistrate properly dismissed count 25 of

the information.
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II.

The Magistrate Properly Dismissed the Money Laundering
Counts Because the State Failed to Show that Lloyd
Intentionally Concealed or Disguised Proceeds from
Unlawful Activity.
The State's money laundering theory rests on the following

language contained in Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1903 (1990) :5
(1) A person commits the offense of money laundering by
financial transaction if, knowing that the property involved
in a financial transaction represents proceeds of some form
of unlawful activity, he conducts or attempts to conduct a
financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of
specified unlawful activity:
(b) knowing that
or in part to:
(i) conceal
the source,
proceeds of

the transaction is designed in whole
or disguise the nature, the location,
the ownership, or the control of the
the specified unlawful activity.

The crucial focus in this case is as follows:

in making certain

financial transaction, did Lloyd intend to conceal or disguise
the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of the
allegedly tainted proceeds?

For bind over purposes, the evidence

at the preliminary hearing was inadequate to show an intent to
conceal or disguise, and the magistrate properly dismissed the
money laundering counts.
Money laundering is not a crime against a citizen-victim,
but is instead an offense against public health and safety.
However, the State argues that the "conceal and disguise" element
is satisfied because Lloyd misdirected the victims into believing

5

It is this statute which was in effect at the time that
the alleged criminal violations took place. The statue was
amended by the Utah Legislature in 1995.
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that the money was under the control of the various companies or
that Lloyd refused to answer questions regarding the whereabouts
of the proceeds.

The state also observes that the magistrate

found that (1) interest payment were drawn on cashiers' checks
(not company checks), (2) the proceeds were put into "shell"
accounts, all but one of which were controlled by Lloyd, and (3)
Lloyd personally withdrew monies "and/or made multiple transfers
of the proceeds between his other controlled accounts and other
entities."

(State's Brief at 43-44)

Accordingly, because of his

alleged deception, Lloyd "effectively concealed the proceeds'
nature, location, ownership and control."

Id.

The state's theory attempts to reach conduct that does not
amount to money laundering under the Utah statute.

The factual

analysis advanced by the State, if accepted as true, demonstrates
a continuous fraudulent scheme committed by an investment advisor
against specific individual victims who had invested money
through that advisor.
Originally, money laundering statutes (as well as cash
transaction reporting statutes) were enacted by legislatures to
punish the concealment of assets derived from the narcotics
trade.

See John K. Villa, Banking Crimes: Fraud, Money

Laundering, and Embezzlement § 8.01 (1987) (discussing public
concern for drug trade interdiction and punishment as the
catalyst for federal laundering statutes).

Accordingly, in

United States v. Dimeck, 24 F.3d 1239, 1247 (10th Cir. 1994), the
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court observed that the federal "money laundering statute was
designed to punish those drug dealers who thereafter take the
additional step of attempting to legitimize their proceeds so
that observers think their money is derived from legal
enterprises."

In other words, laundering statutes are intended

to make it difficult for criminals to enjoy the fruits of their
crimes.
Accordingly, the "conceal or disguise" language is aimed at
attributing criminal liability when a person attempts to hide the
unlawful activity, by a financial transaction, from the
authorities

(law enforcement, the courts, the Internal Revenue

Service, etc.).

A person does not "launder" money to conceal it

from the victims of fraud.
Because money laundering statutes, like racketeering
statutes, are new weapons available to state and federal
prosecutors, courts have been asked to decide how broadly
statutes should be interpreted.

The Tenth Circuit, for example

has rejected a broad reading of the federal money laundering
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1956.

In United States v. Sanders, 928 F.2d

940 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 846 (1991), the defendant
was convicted of narcotic, racketeering, and money laundering
offenses.

On appeal, defendant argued that at trial the

prosecution presented insufficient evidence to establish that his
purchase of two cars was for the purpose of concealing or
disguising drug proceeds under section 1956. Section 1956 is
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structured much like the Utah money laundering statute.

As in

the case at bar, in Sanders the relevant portion of the statute
was the concealment or disguise prong set forth in 18 U.S.C. §
1956(a)(1)(B)(i).

IdL at 944-45.

The Sanders court observed that the defendant and his wife
had both been present when the cars were purchased and they had
used the cars conspicuously, two facts which undermined the
element of concealment.

Further, although one of the cars was

titled in the defendant's daughter's name, there was sufficient
connection to the defendant (i.e., his presence during the
purchase of the car and his subsequent use of the car), to refute
the element of concealment.

In a footnote, the court in Sanders

also pointed out that the legislative history of the federal
statute demonstrated that the "'language of the statute is
intended to include transactions designed to conceal the identity
of the participants to the transactions, where it can also be
proved that the funds involved in the transaction are in fact the
proceeds of the crime.'"

Id. at 946 n.3 (quoting Senate Report

No. 99-433).
In addition, the court quickly rejected the argument
advanced by the government that the statute should be broadly
interpreted to reach all transactions, however ordinary, which
involve proceeds of unlawful activity.

Id. at 946.

The holding

in Sanders was then reaffirmed by the Tenth Circuit in United
States v. Lovett, 964 F.2d 1029, 1036 (10th Cir.), cert, denied,
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113 S.Ct. 169 (1992), where the court reversed a money laundering
conviction because there was insufficient evidence of intent to
conceal.

The defendant had created the impression with a car

salesman that defendant operated a lucrative siding business, and
he even offered the salesman a job.
The Fifth Circuit recently reached the same result in United
States v. Dobbs, 63 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1995).

In that case, the

defendant's convictions for money laundering were reversed absent
evidence that he had attempted to disguise the nature, location,
source, ownership, or control of the proceeds which the defendant
obtained by fraudulently disposing of loan collateral.

In one

instance, the defendant, a rancher in Texas, had deposited the
illegal proceeds in his wife's bank account.
used to pay household and ranch expenses.

The funds were then

In the second

instance, the defendant converted the money into four cashiers
checks which were again used to pay household and ranch expenses.
Such transactions, the Dobbs court concluded, were as open and
notorious as a typical bank transaction may be, and failed to
show that the defendant had attempted to conceal the origin of
the money or disguise his relationship to the transactions in
order to launder the money.

Id. at 397-98.

See also Dimeck, 24

F.3d at 1245 (it is necessary to show desire to create appearance
of legitimate wealth or otherwise to conceal nature of funds so
that it might enter the economy as legitimate funds); United
States v. Gonzalez-Rodriguez, 966 F.2d 918, 926 (5th Cir. 1992)
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(overturning money laundering conviction because insufficient
evidence of a design to conceal nature and source of drug
proceeds).
In United States v. Garcia-Emmanuel, 14 F.3d 1469 (10th Cir.
1994), the Tenth Circuit again turned a critical eye to section
1956.

The focus in this case was whether the defendant knew that

his transactions were designed , in whole or in part, to conceal
or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or control
of the proceeds of his drug business.

Importantly, the court

stated that when a person engages in a transaction for present
personal benefit, and not to create the appearance of legitimate
wealth, this does not
statute.

violate the federal money laundering

Id. at 1474.

"While there are many things that

criminals can do with their profits that would arouse suspicion
of an intent to launder the money, actions that are merely
suspicious and do not provide substantial evidence of a design to
conceal will not alone support a conviction."

Id. at 75; see

also United States v. Rockelman, 49 F.3d 418, 422 (8th Cir. 1995)
(money laundering conviction must be supported by evidence that
defendant knew

that the purchase of a cabin was intended to

conceal or disguise the nature, ownership, source, or control of
the proceeds of the drug dealing; court held no intent to conceal
where transaction was open and conspicuous).
In Garcia-Emmanuel, the defendant was convicted on seventeen
counts of money laundering, conspiracy to possess cocaine with
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intent to distribute, and continuing criminal enterprise.

On

defendant's motion, the trial court granted a judgment of
acquittal on all the money laundering convictions, and both sides
appealed.

The appellate court concluded that the government

failed to prove twelve of the counts, but the court reinstated
the convictions for the remaining five.

14 F.3d at 1473.

The court ruled that the following transactions did not
constitute money laundering under the disguise or conceal prong
of the statute:

(1) the defendant made a mortgage payment with a

cashier's check purchased with drug money, (2) the defendant made
a payment for land where he, and not his restaurant, was named as
remitter on the check, (3) the defendant and his wife purchased a
horse with drug money, and misrepresented to the seller that the
money came from weekend profits at the restaurant; the defendant
accomplished the transaction for his own personal benefit, and
not to conceal the circumstances in which the money was made, (4)
the defendant made an additional payment on the horse just
mentioned, (5) the defendant purchased horses, a horse trailer, a
covered riding arena, and a round riding pen with cash or checks;
the defendant's ownership was open and notorious, and the
government provided no evidence of concealment, (6) the defendant
purchased a watch with a cashier's check upon which he appears as
remitter, and (7) the defendant wired money from his bank account
to the Florida bank account of a Columbian national, and the
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government provided no other evidence about any unusual features
in the transaction.

Id. at 1476-78.

In addition, the court held that the defendant's purchase of
another horse and trailer, which were placed in his wife's name,
did

demonstrate money laundering.

The court wrote that

"[o] rdinarily, this would not be sufficient to convict of money
laundering."

However, at trial the jury heard the testimony of a

co-conspirator that the defendant put the property in his wife's
name to deceive the IRS.
to conceal."

The evidence was "probative of a design

Id. at 1478.

Indeed, in this case the state offered uncontroverted
evidence that Lloyd was the signatory on all but one of the
accounts into which the proceeds were deposited.

The individual

investors no doubt received the cancelled checks that had been
given to Lloyd and which Lloyd had deposited into the various
accounts over which he had control.

Each check would reflect the

financial institution where the check was deposited as well as
the date of deposit.

Assuming that Lloyd had committed the

offenses set forth in counts 1 through 24, there was no attempt
whatsoever to conceal the fact that he controlled those accounts
and that the money came from the investors.

Again, if he did not

disclose the fact to the investors that he controlled the
accounts, then that might be further evidence of fraud, not money
laundering.

The state also closely focusses on transactions

between the accounts controlled by Lloyd.
35

However, the notion

that such transfers were accomplished in order to "conceal or
disguise" the money makes no sense.

Such transfers left an

obvious paper trail, and in any event, it is the state's theory
that the alleged victims were not even aware of the accounts.
Because Lloyd was the signatory on the accounts, it is
inconceivable that he was trying to conceal or disguise anything
by shuffling funds back and forth between those accounts.

If

there is something suspicious about that activity, do not lead to
a logical inference of an intent to conceal or disguise.
Another important point is that there has been no attempt in
this case to provide a full accounting of all of the transactions
pertaining to the various bank accounts relevant to the money
laundering charges, and this was of considerable concern to the
magistrate.

(R. at 1273)

Verdi White did not follow the money

all the way through from its point of origin to the final
recipient.

Following the money by obtaining a complete

transactional record for each account would have been easy to do,
and would have more clearly shown Lloyd's intent.
As the foregoing demonstrates, the state has produced no
evidence that Lloyd attempted to conceal or disguise the
proceeds.

Quite the opposite is true.

The alleged victims could

easily have discovered where the money was deposited and who
controlled each account.

This has nothing to do with incompetent

money laundering as the state suggests (State's Brief at 46-47),
but with the intent to conceal.

Approaching the allegations in a
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light most favorable to the state, the purported reason for
setting up the bank accounts into which the checks were deposited
was so that Lloyd could gain control of the money for his
personal use.

In other words, the transactions had nothing to do

with concealment, but instead the transactions were allegedly
designed to permit Lloyd to gain access to the money obtained
from the fraud perpetrated on the victims.

In other words, the

bank accounts were set up to further the objectives of the
fraudulent scheme.

Indeed, in his affidavit in support of the

original information, Verdi White said as much:

the financial

transactions accomplished by Lloyd were done "all for the purpose
of continuing the unlawful activity of securities fraud."
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(R. at

After the preliminary hearing, defense counsel observed that

after the investors gave the checks to Lloyd, the money was
deposited in the appropriate account bearing the name of the
company:

"every check shows that.

Every deposit shows that.

On

the back of each check that was presented here, it shows that's
where the money went.

So it can't be that transaction that is

used to disguise [or] conceal either the nature, the location,
the source or the ownership or the control of the funds."

(R. at

1271-72)
Likewise, the magistrate expressed serious concern about the
evidence supporting the money laundering counts, and explained
that
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the evidence that was presented by the State regarding
the sources of the money was very inadequate. I mean,
there were a lot of unanswered questions here. . . . I
was not very pleased with what was presented in terms
of, you know, where the money came from, where it went
to. There were a lot of unanswered questions in the
whole transaction and trying to identify exactly what
was happening. And to this day, I have a lot of
questions in my mind.
(R. at 1273)
In short, based on the evidence that was offered the
magistrate did not find probable cause to believe that there was
an intent to conceal or disguise.

The state also argues that

Lloyd's intent is manifested by the evasive responses he gave to
the investors when the investors later asked Lloyd about the
location of the money.

However, it is Lloyd's state of mind at

the time of the transaction that matters.

After all, money

laundering is about making illegally obtained proceeds appear
legitimate.

Relevant to that inquiry are the circumstances

directly surrounding the transaction, not statements that might
have been made well after the transaction occurred.
In sum, the state provided and inadequate and incomplete
picture of any alleged money laundering by Lloyd, and failed to
demonstrate the necessary intent to conceal or disguise.
state failed to meet its burden on counts 26-35, and the
magistrate properly dismissed those counts.
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The

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing facts and argument, Lloyd requests
this Court to affirm the magistrate's dismissal of the
racketeering count and the money laundering counts.
DATED this ^J^^^iav of January, 1997.
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